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I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of wealth depends, not wholly, indeed, but
largely, on a [society's] institutions; and the character of [a
society's] institutions is determined, not by immutable economic
laws, but by the values, preferences, interests and ideals which
rule at any moment in a given society.'
In general, African Americans did not experience the "wealth effect" connected
with the booming American economy of the 1990s. 2 This Essay addresses the asset
poverty of blacks in America and how the Supreme Court's affirmative action
decisions play a role in continuing that poverty. In particular, this Essay addresses
how Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's affirmative action opinions further
institutionalize the "whiteness as property"3 character of America's institutions.
O'Connor is the subject of this Essay rather than one of the other conservatives on
the Court because, as this Essay will demonstrate, she writes as a moderate voice
so that she can be the Court's point person on some of the "hot button" issues.
* Professor of Law, Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law. B.A., Dillard
University; J.D., Southern Methodist University Law School.
I. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/JWHITE WEALTH 127 (1995)
(quoting R. H. TAWNEY, EQUALITY (1952)) (alteration in original).
2. Yochi J. Dreazen, US. Racial Wealth Gap Remains Huge-Despite Booming Economy,
Disparities Didn't Alter in the Course of the 1990s, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2000, at A2.
3. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
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Nevertheless, O'Connor is not moderate on questions of race. She is deeply hostile
to affirmative action. Her opinions are only facially moderate. Without exception,
she takes the conservative position that affirmative action plans are unconstitutional.
In fact, she has authored the conservative party line opinions on affirmative action,
thereby creating blockades to use where none previously existed. O'Connor seeks
power, stakes out her position, and proceeds to use whatever rule of law she needs
in order to reach her desired result. She will use a rule although it is one she has
previously disavowed, and if the rule does not exist, she creates it.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor is an affirmative action, feminist movement
appointee. Her position on the bench is the product of President Ronald Reagan's
campaign promise to appoint a woman to the United States Supreme Court upon his
election.4 Ironically, although O'Connor has arguably benefited from affirmative
action, she has studiously worked at writing opinions that find affirmative action
plans unconstitutional.
O'Connor writes about the "stigma" of being unqualified, one that minorities
face because of affirmative action.' She has also written about potential stigma as
an outgrowth of affirmative action. Nevertheless, O'Connor did not refuse her
appointment, nor has she relinquished her seat on the Court because of the potential
stigma attached to her appointment as President Reagan's token female appointee.
Despite graduating third in her law school class from Stanford in 1952,
O'Connor received no offers to work as a lawyer in the private sector.7 However,
O'Connor found work as a law clerk and deputy county attorney in the San Mateo
County attorney's office.' Subsequent to this work, O'Connor worked in Frankfurt,
West Germany as a civilian lawyer for the United States Army, while her husband
served in the Judge Advocate General's Corps.9 Next, O'Connor returned to
4. See DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETrE 48 (1988).
5. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 604 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating
that racial classifications may stigmatize those groups singled out for different treatment), overruled
by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) ("Classifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic
harm.").
6. See Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 603-04; JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493-94; see also
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of Justices
O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 219, 220 (1996) ("The current conservative
Justices feel as free to adopt specific moral agendas and incorporate them in their interpretation of
constitutional law as the liberal Justices they have attacked."). Gottlieb, while pointing out that race
distinction should not be tolerated, says:
[R]ace also reflected for many a confirmation of their own social
superiority.... Modem conservatism has struggled with the relation between
race, character and socio-economic position. Conservatives can treat socio-
economic position as a reflection of underlying character, and, harking back to
the apologists of slavery, treat the relatively poor socio-economic position of
blacks as a reflection of racial character.
Id. at 240. "The hypothesis that the conservatives on the Court prefer to treat discrimination as a
parable of character is embodied in the pattern of their opinions." Id. at 243.
7. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 339 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed.,
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Phoenix where she opened her own law firm with another lawyer?0 In 1965,
O'Connor became an assistant attorney general for Arizona." She was appointed
to fill a vacancy in the Arizona state senate in 1969 and was subsequently elected
to two full terms?2 O'Connor began her career on the bench in 1974 when she was
elected to sit on the Maricopa County Superior Court.13 In 1979, she was appointed
to the Arizona Court of Appeals.' 4 In 1981, O'Connor received her Supreme Court
appointment."5 Despite O'Connor's experience, one can be certain that some well-
deserving white male on President Reagan's short list of appointees did not get the
job because of the discriminatory gender preference in favor of O'Connor.
Justice O'Connor is not a swing vote on the Court in matters of racial
affirmative action plans as some believe. To the contrary, she is the chief architect
in dismantling these plans. No less deleterious than Bull Connor's Alabama helmet
police and savage dogs were to the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, O'Connor's
opinions have dismantled affirmative action programs intended to provide equal
economic opportunity to African Americans. Justice O'Connor invests heavily in
economic turf protection on behalf of wealthy white Americans by engaging in a
highly sophisticated form of war that, stripped of its black robes, suited attire, and
United States Supreme Court chambers, is analogous to street gang warfare.
As a member of the United States Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor has
engaged, and continues to engage, in an opportunistic enterprise. She takes every
opportunity to add to existing institutionalized white preferences in wealth
distribution. In the real world of the ongoing Confederacy, white skin carries
entitlement to economic opportunity at the exclusion of African Americans. 17 As
chief architect for the disassembly of affirmative action plans, O'Connor has also
carefully crafted obstacles to overcome in shepherding an affirmative action plan
through her labyrinth. For example, her opinions craftily leave room for affirmative
action optimists to believe that some plan might succeed.' 8 However, O'Connor
always construes the law to disfavor the affirmative action plan because of
unconstitutional racial preference.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in City ofRichmondv. JA. Croson Co.'9 is the lead
bulldozer in her dismantling of affirmative action jurisprudence. When Croson is
read alongside her other opinions on affirmative action, she emerges as an elitist,




13. THE SUPREME CouRT JUSTICES, supra note 7, at 339.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See SAA BuLLARD, FREE AT LAsT 26-27 (1993).
17. See Harris, supra note 3, at 1789 ("The fundamental precept of whiteness-the core of its
value-is exclusivity.").
18. See infra Part II.
19. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (voiding as unconstitutional a construction industry set-aside
benefitting minority-owned subcontractors).
20. Linda S. Greene, Race In the 21st Century: Equality Through Law?, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1515,
1517 (1990). Greene uses "rights of whites" to denote the "tendency to give legal legitimacy to the
efforts of whites, who historically have benefited from racism, to maintain the racial status quo." Id.
20011
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Other scholars have not been kind to O'Connor.2 ' This piece adds to the discussion
concerning O'Connor's affirmative action decisions by supplying the perspective
that these opinions were written to strengthen her position as the power vote on the
Court-to become the Chief Justice in fact, if not in name.
Part II analyzes the affirmative action opinions that Justice O'Connor has
authored, including majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions, and
what I believe to be their impact on African American wealth. Part III discusses
O'Connor's disagreements with Justice Antonin Scalia. These disagreements are
important because Scalia's attacks call attention to O'Connor's political nature and
note that O'Connor says whatever she needs to say in order to reach her desired
result. Part III also places O'Connor's affirmative action opinions within the
context of the Court and argues that O'Connor seeks to dominate' the Court and
grass-roots-level politics. Part IV concludes with some comments on the impact of
O'Connor's opinions on African American wealth and the global economy.
II. THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DECISIONS
This Part provides insight into Justice O'Connor's primal intent to preserve
white status quo elitism each time she confronts an affirmative action plan. Her
opinions guarantee the demise of these plans. To borrow one of O'Connor's
frequently used terms, the "troubling" issue is whether the Justices whose votes
helped to dismantle affirmative action plans actually believed their own opinions.
One would almost prefer that the Justices have a personal stake in preserving the
white elitist status quo and serving their own self-interests, rather than having an
aloof perspective on the reality of racism in this country. Worse yet, it could be that
the Justices are so limited in their world view that their comprehension of
institutional racism is at best a formalistic embrace of the status quo, and at worst
a resolute fidelity to "white supremacy." 23
The continued maintenance of the status quo in America by regarding
"whiteness as property"'24 will slaughter us all, black and white alike, in the global
21. See generally EDWARD P. LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS (1998) (providing an inside look at
what transpires behind the closed doors of the U.S. Supreme Court); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., An
Open Letterfrom One Black Scholar to Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: Or, How Not to Become Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 21 (1994) (arguing that Justice O'Connor's
jurisprudence of race has been dismissive of black people's concerns); Judith Olans Brown et al., The
Rugged Feminism of Sandra Day O'Connor, 32 IND. L. REV. 1219 (1999) (finding that Justice
O'Connor's conclusions are often at odds with the feminist agenda).
22. See FRIEDREICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL 18 (Helen Zimmem trans., Henry
Regnery Co. 1949) ("A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength-life itself is Will to
Power.").
23. Francis L. Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1024 n.129 (1989). White supremacy refers to a "political,
economic, and cultural system in which whites overwhelmingly control power and material resources,
(and] conscious and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are widespread...I." Id.;
see also Harris, supra note 3, at 1714 n.10 (adopting Ansley's definition of white supremacy). See
generally ALVIN TOFFLER, THE THIRD WAVE (1981) (discussing industrial-age persons holding on to
the status quo and refusing to move, without applied pressure, into the information age).
24. Harris, supra note 3, at 1707.
[Vol. 53: 117
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economy.' International economies are too inextricably bound together to afford
the luxury of protective entitlements for whites institutionalized under a reign of
white supremacy-a reign that simultaneously suppresses the assertive
entrepreneurial spirit of African Americans.
The Supreme Court is a political entity that bases its decisions along the lines
of the Justices' ideological propensities. In the political war over wealth
distribution, Justice O'Connor's opinions eradicate affmnative action plans and
opportunities for African Americans that would arise under those plans. O'Connor
writes as if she does not know that this country has a history of white supremacy
and racism. Although she writes of equal protection as a guarantee for individuals
and not groups,26 her appointment itself came out of a movement to advance the
opportunities of a group-women.
O'Connor's elitism is emphasized in her failure to acknowledge the "withering-
on-the-vine" effect of group racial outcasting in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson
Co.27 She wrote the Croson opinion for the Court as if the public construction
bidding process in Richmond, Virginiamight, on the odd occasion, have individual
occurrences of racism. She exemplifies the notion that "[o]ne can only find what the
search allows in the sense that the search fails to recognize anything else. 28 In
Closed Chambers, Edward Lazarus criticizes O'Connor's Croson opinion:
[T]here was something deeply unsettling about O'Connor's
approach. Her presentation of both the facts and the law was
skewed by a seemingly calculated omission.... Few cities had
a stronger symbolic link to the slave economy of the old South,
and, perhaps more pertinently, few communities had resisted more
persistently the modem legal command of black equality.29
In what school of thoughthas Justice O'Connor situated herself? "Over the last
few years, a substantial and growing number of Supreme Court Justices, federal
judges, and some theorists, including Raoul Berger, Robert Bork, Frank
Easterbrook, Michael McConnell, Sandra Day O'Connor, Richard Posner, and
Antonin Scalia, have begun to articulate a profoundly conservative interpretation
25. See Bob Deans, White House Faces Worldwide Resentment of Policies, THE ATLANTA J.
CONST., May 6, 2001, at A7, for a discussion of the international ballot that voted the United States
off the United Nations Human Rights Commission. In this article, speaking about a secret ballot vote
among fifty-four nations, RobertPastor, an Emory University professor of political science, stated as
follows: "They're a little fed up with the United States.... Our unilateral attitude was one of many
factors in causing us to lose that vote." Id. Of the fifty-four nations, at least forty-three had indicated
they would support U.S. membership, but only twenty-nine in fact did so. Id. The article concludes
with the professor's analysis that unless President George W. Bush articulates a more inclusive policy
in laying out a strategy for international issues, "we will not only have problems with our allies and
with Russia and China, but our allies, Russia and China might find reason to coordinate their approach
to us. This would make it difficult for us to do almost anything in the world." Id.
26. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469,493 (1989).
27. Id.
28. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT Or; REASON 4(1998).
29. LAZARus, supra note 21, at 298.
2001]
5
Tarpley: A Comment on Justice O'Connor's Quest for Power and Its Impact on
Published by Scholar Commons, 2001
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the constitutional tradition."3 In Progressive and Conservative
Constitutionalism, Robin West compares a progressive interpretation of the
Constitution with a conservative interpretation of the Constitution.3' West points out
that the Supreme Court is dominated by conservative constitutionalism.32 Indeed,
West notes that "conservative constitutionalism... may soon dominate the federal
judiciary, and has already profoundly shaped the constitutional law of the
foreseeable future."33 As one of many who wish to protect white entitlement,
O'Connor makes it virtually impossible forAfrican Americans to rise socially if the
route is via an affirmative action plan. The political consequence of O'Connor's
writing has been the nullification of the political will at a grass roots level.
A. Cases
O'Connor's linchpin decision on affirmative action is City ofRichmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.34 While it is unlikely that anyone is unfamiliar with the term
"affirmative action," in this Essay "affirmative action" means an intentional effort
of inclusion through a "policy or program for correcting the effects of
discrimination in the employment or education of members of certain groups
35
such as African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, and women.
The following is a recitation of facts selectively excerpted from Justice
O'Connor's Croson opinion for the Court:
On April 11, 1983, the Richmond City Council adopted the
Minority Business Utilization Plan (the Plan). The Plan required
prime contractors to whom the city awarded construction
contracts to subcontract at least 30% of the dollar amount of the
contract to one or more Minority Business Enterprises
(MBE[s])....
The plan defined an MBE as "[a] business at least fifty-one
(51) percent of which is owned and controlled.., by minority
group members."
On September 6, 1983, the city of Richmond issued an
invitation to bid on a project for the provision and installation of
certain plumbing fixtures at the city jail. On September 30, 1983,
Eugene Bonn, the regional manager of J.A. Croson Company
(Croson), a mechanical plumbing and heating contractor, received
the bid forms. The project involved the installation of stainless
steel urinals and water closets in the cityjail. Products of either of
two manufacturers were specified, Acorn Engineering Company
30. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 641
(1990).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 642.
33. Id.
34. 488 U. S. 469 (1989).
35. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICrIONARY 33 (2d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 53: 117
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(Acorn) or Bradley Manufacturing Company (Bradley). Bonn
determined that to meet the 30% set-aside requirement, aminority
contractor would have to supply the fixtures.
... On October 12, 1983, the day the bids were due, Bonn
again telephoned a group of MBE[s]. This time, Melvin Brown,
president of Continental Metal Hose (Continental), a local MBE,
indicated that he wished to participate in the project. Brown
subsequently contacted two sources of the specified fixtures in
order to obtain a price quotation. One supplier, Ferguson
Plumbing Supply, which is not an MBE, had already made a
quotation directly to Croson, and refused to quote the same
fixtures to Continental. Brown also contacted an agent ofBradley,
one of the two manufacturers of the specified fixtures. The agent
was not familiar with Brown or Continental, and indicated that a
credit check was required which would take at least 30 days to
complete.36
Croson finally received a bid from Continental after Croson requested a waiver
from the city of the thirty percent set-aside.37 Continental's bid would have raised
the cost of the projectby $7,663.16, an increase not reflected in Croson's bid on the
project.38 "The city denied both Croson's request for a waiver [from complying
with the plan] and [Croson's] suggestion that the contract price be raised. The city
informed Croson that it had decided to rebid the project."39 Croson sued pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the plan was unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.40 The Federal District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia upheld the city's plan in all respects.4' A divided
panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling.4
The United States Supreme Court found the city's affirmative action plan
unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor wrote the lead opinion.43 The Court held that the
city failed to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest justifying the plan and
that the plan was not narrowly tailored to remedy effects of prior discrimination.'
A crucial fact undermining the MBE's effort to meet the bid criteria was the
limiting supplier specification." Only two suppliers could be used.4 One supplier
refused to even quote a price to the MBE.47 The other supplier would have taken
thirty days to run a credit check on the MBE.48 Therefore, the suppliers
36. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78, 481-82 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at482.
38. Id. at 483.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 483.
41. Id.
42. Croson, 488 U.S. at 483-84.
43. Id. at 476.




48. Croson, 488 U.S. at 482.
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discriminated against the MBE in the bidding process. O'Connor was aware of
these facts because she recited them. However, she chose not to address the refusal
to quote a price to the MBE as a race-related refusal.
O'Connor states:
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from
taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination
within its jurisdiction. If the city of Richmond had evidence
before it that nonminority contractors were systematically
excluding minority businesses from subcontracting opportunities,
it could take action to end the discriminatory exclusion.49
According to this sentence, O'Connor requires a showing of systematic exclusion
in order to uphold an affirmative action plan. Yet, the refusal to quote prices to an
MBE surely was an exclusion. Although the case presented only one incident, the
incident lends support to the belief that such an exclusion was not an isolated
occurrence.
For situations of systematic exclusion, O'Connor's remedy is that "the city
could act to dismantle the closed business system by taking appropriate measures
against those who discriminate on the basis of race or other illegitimate criteria.
50
Thus, she is looking for specific villains to be individually punished. She seeks
punishment of the single wrongdoer rather than economic advancement of the
wounded. Perhaps only when discrimination is openly widespread and entrenched
would O'Connor consider an affirmative action plan necessary.
In 1995, O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court in Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena." Adarand held that federal affirmative action plans implemented by
a federal, state, or local government actor would be reviewed for constitutionality
under the same criteria as those set forth in Croson."2 In Adarand the United States
Department of Transportation awarded the prime contract for a highway
construction project in Colorado to Mountain Gravel and Construction Company."
The contract's terms provided that Mountain Gravel would receive additional
compensation if it hired subcontractors certified as small businesses controlled by
"socially and economically disadvantaged individuals," a financial incentive
legislated to induce the hiring of minority subcontractors.54 Mountain Gravel
awarded the bid to Gonzales Construction Company, a minority subcontractor, even
though Gonzales had not submitted the lowest bid.55 Adarand Constructors, the low
bidder on the project, "filed suit against various federal officials in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming that the race-based
presumptions involved in the use of subcontracting compensation clauses violate[d]
49. Id. at 509.
50. Id. at 509. "In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be
necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion." Id.
51. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
52. Id. at 227-28.
53. Id. at 205.
54. Id. at 205-06.
55. Id. at 205.
[Vol. 53: 117
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Adarand's right to equal protection." 6 In addition to its request for relief, Adarand
sought "injunctive relief against any future use of subcontractor compensation
clauses."'  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
government.5 8 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court. 9
In her opinion for the Court, O'Connor stated that "[w]e think it necessary to
revisit the issue here."6 Justice O'Connor proceeded to lay out a scheme to protect
the status quo into the foreseeable future:
"[A] free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality," should tolerate no retreat from the principle that
government may treat people differently because of their race
only for the most compelling reasons. Accordingly, we hold today
that all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state,
or local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court
under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are
constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
further compelling governmental interests. To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting is inconsistent with that holding, it is
overruled.6 1
O'Connor's hostility towards affirmative action plans is also evident in her
dissenting opinion in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.62 In Metro Broadcasting
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, and Justice O'Connor filed a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Kennedy joined.63 Metro Broadcasting involved the review of two minority
preference programs adoptedby the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).6'
Under the minority preference policy, the FCC considered minority ownership as
"a 'plus' to be weighed together with all other relevant factors. 6s Furthermore, the
FCC planned to increase minority opportunities through a "distress sale" policy.6
56. Id. at 210.




61. Id. at 227 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
62. 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (5-4 decision), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).
63. Id. at 552, 602.
64. Id. at 556.
65. Id. at 557. When evaluating applications for new radio or television stations, the FCC
evaluates the following six factors: "diversification of control of mass media communications, full-
time participation in station operation by owners.... proposed program service, past broadcast
record, efficient use of the frequency, and the character of applicants." Id. at 556-57.
66. Id. at 557. "As a general rule, a licensee whose qualifications to hold a broadcast license
come into question may not assign or transfer that license until the FCC has resolved its
doubts .... The distress sale policy is an exception to that practice, allowing a broadcaster to assign
the license to [a] minority enterprise." Id.
2001]
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Metro Broadcasting challenged the FCC's minority preference policies after the
FCC chose to grant a minority-owned business a license to construct and operate
a new UHF television station in Orlando, Florida.67 The FCC awarded the minority-
owned business the license because the business's "minority credit outweighed
Metro's local residence and civic participation advantage. 68 On review, the FCC
affirmed its grant of the license to the minority-owned business. 69 A divided United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.7
The United States Supreme Court held that the FCC's affirmative action plan
did not violate equal protection principles. 7' Specifically, the Court stated the
following:
We hold that benign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress-even if those measures are not "remedial" in the sense
of being designed to compensate victims of past governmental or
societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the
extent that they serve important governmental objectives within
the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.
Our decision last Term in Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., concerning a minority set-aside program adopted by a
municipality, does not prescribe the level of scrutiny to be applied
to a benign racial classification employed by Congress. 2
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that "[r]acial classifications, whether
providing benefits to or burdening particular racial or ethnic groups, may stigmatize
those groups singled out for different treatment and may create considerable tension
with the Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating individuals upon their
individual merit.,
73
O'Connor's statement regarding the "Nation's widely shared commitment"' 4
is intolerable in the face of the present-day continuance of racial prejudice
throughout the country. One only has to observe the battles that are currently being
fought to remove the Confederate symbol from state flags to know that this "widely
shared commitment" is a farce.
7 5
At another point in her dissent, O'Connor laid down the foundation for what
would later become the Court's opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena:
67. Id. at 558.
68. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 559.
69. Id. at 560.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 566.
72. Id. at 564-65 (citation omitted).
73. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 604.
75. See Marion Manuel, Mississippians Sticking With Flag, THE ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 18,
2001, at Al (describing the failed attempt in Mississippi to have the Confederate battle emblem
removed from the state flag).
[Vol. 53: 117
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Under the appropriate standard, strict scrutiny, only a
compelling interest may support the Government's use of racial
classifications. Modem [i.e., Rehnquist Court] equal protection
doctrine has recognized only one such interest: remedying the
effects of racial discrimination. The interest in increasing the
diversity of broadcast viewpoints is clearly not a compelling
interest.76
Writing for the dissent in Metro Broadcasting, Inc., Justice O'Connor took more
liberty with her rhetoric than she did later when writing the Court's opinion in
Adarand. In Metro Broadcasting, Inc. O'Connor stated that "[flinally, the
Government cannot employ race classifications that unduly burden individuals who
are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups."" With this statement,
O'Connor raised the "unduly burdening" language to an independent requirement
by stating that "[tihe challenged policies fail this independent requirement, as well
as the other constitutional requirements.""
B. Causes
Writing for the Court in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 79 O'Connor,
assured that the City is innocent, ignores in her analysis a fact that she
outlines-that a white parts supplier would not quote a price to a minority
contractor.50 Is this the Court's idea of race-neutral policies? O'Connor's language
raises questions of"How much discrimination is needed to be extreme?" and "How
narrowly must an affirmative action plan be tailored?" At a minimum, O'Connor
could have noted that the supplier, by refusing to quote prices to a black contractor,
should be stricken from the city's list of approved contractors. Perhaps the opinions
of the author and joiners alike, having an uneven playing field tilted in their favor,• " 81
will not vote to level it through affirmative action. Perhaps the jurisprudence of
O'Connor's opinion is simply politics as usual, and her attempts to analyze it
differently are acts of futility.
Generations of families-including the King family-have been fighting
segregationist culture since the 1960s. Nonetheless, economic segregation continues
to be protected in America under the aegis of Justice O'Connor's race-neutral,
76. Metro Broad., Inc., 497 U.S. at 612 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 630.
78. Id.
79. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
80. Id. at482.
81. See Harris, supra note 3, at 1767. Harris states:
The Supreme Court's rejection of affirmative action programs on the
grounds that race-conscious remedial measures are unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-the very constitutional
measure designed to guarantee equality for Blacks-is based on the Court's
chronic refusal to dismantle the institutional protection ofbenefits forwhites that
have been based on white supremacy and maintained at the expense of Blacks.
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color-blind, and politically-motivated, affinnative action opinions. She consistently
writes conservative opinions, rhetorically styled to be viewed as moderate.
From a more global perspective, rather than hampering competition, affirmative
action plans could actually sharpen competition and force some born within the
"good ol' boy network" to compete on an equal playing field. The thorn for Justice
O'Connor is the money, or the opportunity to make money, thereby creating and
building upon wealth. A wealthy black America could create an oppositional
stronghold of power in a political arena historically favoring whites.
Showcasing her intent to strike at the heart of financial equal opportunity,
Justice O'Connor states in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. that "[t]he comparative
licensing and distress sale programs provide the eventual licensee with an
exceptionally valuable property and with a rare and unique opportunity to serve the
local community."82 However, O'Connor dissents from the opinion that upheld the
FCC's minority ownership plan. The "exceptional" value of an air wave license
apparently gave O'Connor license to impose her undue burden test as an
"independent requirement" in addition to "other constitutional requirements."" She
writes that the FCC program "imposes a particularly significant burden."84 Is one
to conclude that the burden of those not preferred is to be measured by the value of
the property delivered into the outstretched hands of the minority licensee? Is a
white potential licensee significantly burdened when an African American receives
a license for a radio or television station from a set-aside program? Probably not.
However, to O'Connor the answer is yes, and her opinion in Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. makes clear that her line in the sand occurs when money, and certainly when
"exceptionally valuable property" is at issue.
In her article on progressive constitutionalism, Robin West addresses a free-
market, conservative perspective on economic power.8 5 "[T]he adoration,
celebration, or, more simply, love ofeconomic power characteristic ofmodern free-
market conservatives implies an archly conservative version of legal pragmatism
or instrumentalism."86 Pointing out that law by any name "can be put to either
radical, liberal, or conservative political ends,"8" West advises that "law is a tool
with which to achieve other independently defined purposes."8
In a synthesis analysis, West says:
When legal pragmatism is combined with the politics of free-
market conservatism, . . . the result is again a profoundly
conservative jurisprudential doctrine: what might be called
"conservative instrumentalism." For the conservative
instrumentalist, law should be organized in such a way as to
82. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
83. See id. ("[T]he Government cannot employ race classifications that unduly burden
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups.... The challenged policies
fail this independent requirement, as well as other constitutional requirements.").
84. Id.
85. West, supra note 30, at 661-62.
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promote free economic competition. Economic competition-the
process by which the wishes, instincts, and desires of the strongest
appropriately become the will of the community, and by which
their perceptions of the world become the truth about reality-is
not just a fact or practice, but a normative principle of modem
life. Law, then, both adjudicative and otherwise, should be used
and interpreted in such a way as to promote best the substantive
values and norms of competitive life. The consequence for
decision-making is that when law must be informed or guided by
a conception of the good, it should embrace whatever decision
will liberate competition."
This last sentence on embracing "whatever decision will liberate
competition,"9 raises the question of what in fact liberates competition. In this
author's mind, the same members of the "good ol' boy network" competing with
each other in the same old way is not liberated competition. There is also a question
to be raised about what West terms "the integrity of the competitive process."9'
West writes:
In this decade, what this conservative interpretation of equality
means, most importantly, is that other than in truly extraordinary
circumstances, no individual's or corporation's competitive
chances in the marketplace will be compromised by societal
efforts to put an end to the substantive, subordinating effects of
private, social, or institutional racism through anticompetitive
affirmative action programs. The [Equal Protection Clause] thus
construed protects not equality so much as the integrity of the
competitive process, and targets not racism (to say nothing of
classism, misogyny, or heterosexism), but race-conscious
governmental decisionmaking. The conservative's conception of
the guarantee of equality thus has nothing to do with putting an
end to racism if "racism" is understood as the white majority's
hatred, contempt, and subordination of nonwhites, and little if
anything to do with achieving equality. Rather, it has everything
to do with protecting competitive values against progressive
political attempts by the state to do so.92
The "integrity" of the competitive process is fundamentally flawed in America.
By what method is competition in the economic marketplace judged to have
integrity when potential competitors come to the foot races with tons of cotton
sacks on their backs? To the contrary, affirmative action programs remove the
cotton sacks, and such programs would be transitory if carried out as
89. Id. at 661 (footnote omitted).
90. Id.
91. West, supra note 30, at 672.
92. Id. (emphasis in original).
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conceptualized. Affirmative action plans would eventually eradicate the very reason
for implementing such plans. As discriminatory practices subside, the need for
affirmative action plans would no longer exist. At that point in time, one could truly
speak to the reality of a competitive process and its integrity.
Justice O'Connor cites the plurality opinion of Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education93 for her proposition that the "standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by
aparticular classification."94 In the Wygantplurality opinion, a collective bargaining
agreement providing preferential treatment for some minority employees in the
event of teacher layoffs was held unconstitutional by the Court.9" O'Connor's
concurring opinion states:
In the final analysis, the diverse formulations and the number
of separate writings put forth by various Members of the Court in
these difficult cases do not necessarily reflect an intractable
fragmentation in opinion with respect to certain core principles.
Ultimately, the Court is at least in accord in believing that a public
employer, consistent with the Constitution, may undertake an
affirmative action program which is designed to further a
legitimate remedial purpose and which implements that purpose
by means that do not impose disproportionate harm on the
interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of innocent
individuals directly and adversely affected by a plan's racial
preference.96
O'Connor shifted her emphasis from "disproportionate harm" in Wygant to
"narrowly tailored," in Croson97 and Adarand.9s However, in Metro Broadcasting
"disproportionate harm" changed to "significant burden," and "unduly burden."99
Apparently, the potential value of a license to the air waves moved Justice
O'Connor to extend her singularly personal reading of the Wygant plurality's
consensus to that of a requirement, independent of the constitutional requirements.
African Americans have reached economic opportunity by way of the civil
rights agenda, arriving sooner than some might have expected. Mercifully, the
entire black national economy is not dependent on Justice O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas. Many African Americans are rising
economically, not only black athletes and Hollywood celebrities. The black middle
class of physicians, lawyers, and entrepreneurs is also increasing."0 O'Connor's
93. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
94. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,494 (1989).
95. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284.
96. Id. at 287.
97. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).
98. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
99. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. See Earl Ofari Hutchinson, Show King the Money, THE BLACK COLLEGIAN ONLINE,
available at http://www.bl ack-collegian.com/african/kingmoney 100.shtml (last visited Oct. 31,2001).
But see OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 92-97 for a discussion on what is meant by the black
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opinions achieve the delay-but hopefully not the permanent prevention-of a
more widely-based black wealth. A base that carries wealth forward from
generation to generation.
C. African American Wealth
In order to understand the impact of Justice O'Connor's affirmative action
opinions on African Americans, one must analyze the large economic disparity
betweenblacks andwhites. According to Oliver and Shapiro inBlack Wealth/White
Wealth, "[i]nherited wealth is a very special kind of money imbued with the
shadows of race."'' Oliver and Shapiro argue that the absence of inherited wealth
accounts for the great wealth disparity between blacks and whites.0 2 The authors
claim that "[flor the most part, the economic foundation of the black middle class
lacks one of the pillars that provide stability and security to middle-class
whites-assets."' °3 Furthermore, "[t]he blackmiddle classpositionis precarious and
fragile with insubstantial wealth resources.""' According to Oliver and Shapiro, this
analysis means that "it is entirely premature to celebrate the rise of the black middle
class. The glass is both half empty and half full, because the wealth data reveal the
middle class:
The economic status of the black middle class is a vital factor in ongoing
debates in the field of racial equity. A frequent question that arises concerns
what one means by "the black middle class." Some demark the limits simply in
terms of income; others include education or occupation in the definition. Most
scholars embrace a class conception based on the work of Karl Marx or Max
Weber and make occupation their central focus. The evidence cited earlier
showing an enlarged middle class touches all these bases-educational
achievement, earnings, and occupation. Aspreviously noted, middle class means
working in a white-collar occupation or being self-employed. In using several
different indicators of class status, we confirm that the economic foundation of
the black middle class is not dependent upon any one way of thinking about
class. The point of this exercise is to show that an accurate and realistic appraisal
of the economic footing of the black middle class reveals its precariousness,
marginality, and fragility. The case for this characterization rests not only on an
inspection of the resources available to the black middle class but on the relative
position of the latter with respect to the white middle class.
Id. at 92-93.
101. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 6.
102. Id. at 5-7. "For the most part, blacks will not partake in divvying up the baby boom bounty.
America's racist legacy is shutting them out. The grandparents and parents of blacks under the age
of forty toiled under segregation, where education and access to decentjobs and wages were severely
restricted. Racialized state policy and the economic detour constrained their ability to enter the post-
World War II housing market. Segregation created an extreme situation in which earlier generations
were unable to build up much, if any, wealth.... [T]he average black family headed by a person over
the age of sixty-five has no net financial assets to pass down to its children. Until the late 1960s there
were few older African Americans with the ability to save much at all, much less invest. And no
savings and no inheritance meant no wealth." Id. at 6-7.
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paradoxical situation in which blacks' wealth has grown while at the same time
falling further behind that of whites."'
0 5
O'Connor's opinions undermine generational wealth for African Americans.
As black contractors, plumbers, and electricians have attempted, and presently
attempt, to grow wealth in small businesses, O'Connor's opinions propose that
racial inequality in the bidding process is simply a tough and punishing reality
without a remedy. O'Connor's opinions disregard a history that created limited
opportunities for African Americans.
Oliver and Shapiro come to a conclusion that others seem to agree with,0 6 but
which the O'Connor opinions disavow:
Disparities in wealth between blacks and whites are not the
product of haphazard events, inborn traits, isolated incidents or
solely contemporary individual accomplishments. Rather, wealth
inequality has been structured over many generations through the
same systemic barriers that have hampered blacks throughout
their history in American society: slavery, Jim Crow, so-called de
jure discrimination, and institutionalized racism. 1
07
Oliver and Shapiro maintain that blacks are subject to asset deprivation, "both
absolutely and in relation to whites. . ."'0' They claim that this deprivation
reverberates throughout the economic circumstances of African Americans. '9 In
studying wealth as a social phenomenon, Oliver and Shapiro confirm our already
known anecdotal information: "When the wealth pies are placed on the table, very
few black households are served.""'
An "intergenerational transmission of inequality" rather than the wealth
sustaining inheritance of assets, shows how "an oppressive racial legacy continues
to shape American society through the reproduction of inequality generation after
generation.""' A middle-class white child can look forward to inherited wealth,
occupational upward mobility, and institutional racism skewed in his favor." 2 Not
105. Id. at 7-8.
106. See generally Harris, supra note 3 (discussing the evolution of "whiteness" into a form of
property which continues to influence the Court's decisions and serve as a barrier to change); Greene,
supra note 20 (asserting that the new legal order, while no longer overtly racist, legitimates the
maintenance of racial subordination and domination).
107. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 12-13 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 97-98.
109. Id. at 98.
110. Id. at 103.
111. Id. at 128.
112. Id. at 156-60.
[Vol. 53:117
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol53/iss1/7
JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S QUEST FOR POWER
so for the middle-class black child."' The Oliver and Shapiro analysis sets forth
three ways in which wealth is transmitted from one generation to another:
First, inequality is generated by the contemporary American
social structure through severe distinctions in human capital,
sociological, and labor market factors. We have seen that racially
stratified experiences in schooling, jobs and family life result in
resource circumstances unmitigatedly marked by race....
The second layer of inequality ... concerns institutional and
policy factors, both public and private. In examining the practices
surrounding home ownership ... differential access to mortgage
and housing markets and the racial valuation of neighborhoods
result in enormous asset discrepancies.... Home ownership is
without question the single most important institutionally
sanctioned means by which assets are accumulated. At the same
time, however, it is worth remembering that housing represents
only one arena, albeit the most important one, of institutional
discrimination.
The third layer of racial inequality in America is transmitted
from generation to generation. We saw who inherited money both
during the lifetime and after the death of a parent. Disparities
113. OLIVER& SHAPiRO, supra note 1, at 156-60. Oliver and Shapiro explain:
[D]ata confirm and partially document that wealth is transmitted from one
generation to another in two additional ways. First, they reveal the existence of
distinctions between white and blackpattems of occupational mobility. This part
of the story is important, because it speaks to the comparative ability of white
and black parents to pass along status to them and to help their children move
up the social and occupational ladders. Second, and more directly bearing on
wealth, [data in conjunction with our interviews highlight the vastly different
wealth rewards that social mobility confers on whites and blacks....
Ourresults indicate a strikingly high degree ofoccupational inheritance for
those at the top of the status hierarchy. For respondents with upper-white-collar
parents, occupational status is maintained nearly 60 percent of the time. By the
same token, only one in eight of those with upper-white-collarbackgrounds find
themselves in the lowest ranking group. At the other end of the occupational
range nearly one-third, like their parents, are in low-skilled occupations. Thus
two-thirds of those from lower-blue-collar backgrounds achieved mobility.
Those from lower-white-collarbackgrounds experience a noteworthy amount of
upward mobility; over halfsecure upper-white-collar professional and technical
positions.
Things look very different, however, when we break down our findings by
race. Results reveal a tale of"two mobilities." For whites the mobility figures for
the general population are reproduced with a sharper emphasis on achievement
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emerged at three levels of inheritance: cultural capital, milestone
events, and traditional bequests.'
1 4
Arguing "that the racialization of the welfare state and institutional
discrimination are fundamental reasons for the persistent wealth disparities"
between blacks and whites, Oliver and Shapiro identify government policies as the
culprit."'5 Government policies have discriminated against blacks in their "quest for
economic security" while simultaneously aiding and abetting whites in their
expansion of wealth."6
The following language from Black Wealth/White Wealth challenges the "free
market theory of constitutional conservatism" discussed by West" 7 and written
about in O'Connor's affirmative action decisions:" 8
These [governmental] policies are not the result of the
workings of the free market or the demands of modem industrial
society; they are, rather, a function of the political power of elites.
The powerful protect and extend their interests by way of
discriminatory laws and social policies, while minorities unite to
contest them. Black political mobilization has removed barriers to
black economic security, but the process is uneven. As blacks take
one step forward, new and more intransigent legislative orjudicial
decisions push them back two steps....
The inheritance of accumulated disadvantages over
generations has, in many ways, shortchanged African Americans
of the rather dramatic mobility gains they have achieved. While
blacks have made stunning educational strides, entered middle-
class occupations at an impressive rate, and moved into political
positions in numbers unheard of a quarter of a century ago, they
have been unable to surmount the historical obstacles that inhibit
their accumulation of wealth. Still today, they bear the brunt of
the sedimentation of racial inequality.
Of course, this may simply be another way of saying that
wealth is not only a function of achievement; rather, it can rise or
fall in accordance with racially differential state policies .... " 9
Justice O'Connor's opinions perpetuate a jurisprudence that continues to
deprive blacks of a foundation upon which to build their wealth. There is no
generational wealth among blacks because there is no societal or governmental
114. Id. at 169.
115. Id. at 174.
116. Id. Some of the government policies which were discriminatory included the Fair Housing
Act, Social Security, and the United States Tax Code. Id.
117. See West, supra note 30, at 661-62.
118. See supra Part II.A.
119. OLIVER& SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 174-75, 178.
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foundation upon which blacks can build and transfer their wealth. Self-employed
small business owners, such as the Minority Business Enterprise in Croson120 and
the subcontractor in Adarand,22 are examples of blacks who could, with the
opportunity to participate in the capitalist system, generate sufficient income to
ultimately amass wealth.
The real tragedy perpetuated by institutional white supremacy and the
O'Connor opinions does not stop at the boundary lines of the black ghetto. The
dearth of a sufficiently educated, high-tech labor pool"n is a direct result of an
expansive spectrum of the population, namely blacks and other poor Americans,
receiving minimal education.'23 If competition makes the product better, greater
opportunity to compete as the contractor, rather than as only the laborer, would be
beneficial to the entire country, not just blacks. There is an economic disservice
done to the United States economy when only a few sit down at the competitive
table. Wake up conservative constitutionalists, the wealthier the population is
overall, the more likely our country is to have a vast, better educated, high-tech
labor pool. America can hire its own. Furthermore, hiring through an affirmative
action plan is far more liberating than depending on immigrant labor.
As we move away from the industrial age and into the information age,
"whiteness as property ' ' is too expensive to maintain. More efficient countries
that direct human energy to the highest possible level of capability will surpass the
United States because some in this country have a collective belief in, and
insistence on, white preference. At best, O'Connor's jurisprudence is too short-
sighted, too "narrowly tailored,"' "as and too "unduly burden[some]' 26 for a country
struggling to maintain global economic dominance. Opinions that are hostile to
affirmative action, and thus legitimize the hostility in the continuing Confederacy,
delay some of America's best and brightest in getting to the tables of negotiation
and harvest. These same opinions retard this country's productivity potential.
Justice O'Connor's opinions showcase her as an elitist as well as a politician.
Elitism requires scarcity. When too many African Americans are included in the
capitalist market place, the scarcity that effectuates elitism disappears. Most elitists
do not want to become commoners. In Adarand, Justice O'Connor devotes
120. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,482 (1989).
121. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,205 (1995).
122. See, e.g., Carolyn Lockhead, Plan to Boost Tech-Worker Visas is Victim of Election-Year
Politics, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25,2000, at Al (discussing claim by high-tech companies that unless the
cap on high-tech visas increases, hundreds of thousands of jobs will be vacant and operations will
move overseas); Tom McGhie, Silicon Valley Logs on High-Tech Immigrants, MAIL ON SUNDAY
(London), Feb. 20, 2001, at 4 (describing how California's Silicon Valley has partly solved the
problem of high-tech labor shortages by persuading the government to allow more skilled immigrant
visas).
123. Eric Alterman, The Class of the Internet, WORTH, Winter 2000/2001, available at
http://wv.worth.comlcontentarticlesIZZZUEI 8IFGC.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
124. Harris, supra note 3, at 1721.
125. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,507 (1989); Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
126. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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significant space to addressing the dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens. 27 She also
addresses the overruling of Metro Broadcasting in her discussion of stare decisis. '
Having taken her stance and written the scrutiny test 29 to be applied to future
affirmative action plans, O'Connor promotes the status quo elitism. Ironically
O'Connor, the first woman appointed to the United States Supreme Court, took her
seat and began eviscerating the concept of affirmative action that got her there. By
handling discriminatory exclusion on an individual, case-by-case basis, O'Connor
can continue to delay the economic rise of African Americans through the
beginning of the twenty-first century.
III. THE POLITICIAN AT WORK
A. The Battles
she walked into forbidden worlds
impaled on the weapon of her own pale skin
she was a sentinel
at impromptu planning sessions
of her own destruction ....
Justice Antonin Scalia has been one of Justice O'Connor's strongest critics,
perhaps the strongest. Interestingly, Scalia's attacks on O'Connor highlight
O'Connor's political nature, as exhibited in her opinions. Although Scalia is
sometimes O'Connor's ally on other issues, he discredits O'Connor's affirmative
action opinions and emphasizes that O'Connor's adherence to policy and precedent
is elastic. She stretches policy and precedent as far as she needs to in order to carry
out her agenda, or she simply decides to "revisit the issue." Justice O'Connor leaves
herself that politician's wiggle room.
In Croson, Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, writes that although he
agrees with much of O'Connor's opinion, he does not agree "with Justice
O'Connor's dictum .... ."13 Furthermore, when the Court decided Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services,"' in which the court reconsiders Roe v. Wade,
I33
Scalia strongly criticizes O'Connor's concurring opinion: "[Justice O'Connor's]
assertion .... that a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint' requires us to avoid
reconsidering Roe, cannot be taken seriously."'' 4 Scalia relentlessly points out that
it "is not the rule of avoiding constitutional issues where possible, but the quite
127. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227-31 ("[W]e believe [Justice Stevens']
criticisms reflect a serious misunderstanding of our opinion.").
128. Id. at 225-27.
129. Id. at 278 ("[T]he point of strict scrutiny is to 'differentiate between' permissible and
impermissible governmental use of race.").
130. Harris, supra note 3, at 1709 (quoting Cheryl I. Harris,poem for alma (1990) (unpublished
poem, on file at the Harvard Law School Library)).
131. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 520.
132. 492 U. S. 490 (1989).
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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separate principle that we will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader
than is required by the precise facts .... Scalia describes the Court's Webster
decision as a contrivance "to avoid almost any decision of national import.... .136
Scalia cites O'Connor's decision in Croson as an example of her willingness to
write more than the case requires for the decision when it suits her purposes.137
Scalia's concurrence in Webster reveals his frustration with O'Connor's use of
judicial restraint to avoid overturning Roe.33 When Scalia states, "[g]iven the
Court's newly contracted abstemiousness"' 39 and"under our newly discovered 'no-
broader-than-necessary' requirement,"'" he is clearly referencing O'Connor's
tendency to use judicial restraint when she chooses. Scalia professed dismay
regarding O'Connor's hesitation about Rehnquist's restructuring 4 ofRoe.' 42"After
all, [as] Scalia points out, Rehnquist's disposal of the trimester framework was
based in large part on O'Connor's own prior critique.' 43
In Battles on the Bench, Phillip J. Cooper chronicles the battles between
O'Connor and Scalia growing out O'Connor's opinion in Croson and her
concurrence in Webster.'44 Cooper writes:
A quite extraordinary event occurred on the last day of the
Supreme Court's October 1988 term. Justice Antonin Scalia
issued a stinging, pointed, and seemingly quite personal attack on
a colleague in the form of a concurring opinion. The case was a
suit against a Missouri statute that was adopted as a deliberate
challenge to the Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision that
recognized a right to abortion. What made Scalia's opinion so
unusual was that it was not a criticism of the Court, or even a
response to a dissenter. It was, rather, a public upbraiding of
another concurring justice, Sandra Day O'Connor.
What made it worse was the public perception that Scalia was
attempting to intimidate O'Connor into providing the crucial fifth
vote that would reverse Roe v. Wade. That impression was
reinforced because the Webster clash came just six months after
a ruling in which Scalia had issued another stinging concurrence,
this one aimed at the majority opinion preparedby O'Connor. Just
to make certain that the point of his criticism was not lost, Scalia's
135. Id. at 533 (quoting O'Connor's concurring opinion which quoted Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936)).
136. Id. at 532.
137. Id. at 533.
138. See id. at 532-34.
139. Webster, 492 U.S. at 537 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140. Id.
141. Webster, 492 U.S. at 517-20. "The key elements of the Roe framework-trimesters and
viability-are not found in the text of the Constitution [or in constitutional principles].... [T]he
result has been a web of legal rules ... resembling a code of regulations rather than a body of
constitutional doctrine." Id. at 517.
142. Id. at 532-35, 536 n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
143. LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 408.
144. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATMLES ON THE BENCH 49-52 (1995).
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Webster concurrence took O'Connor to task and cited her own
opinion in the earlier case, Richmond v. Croson, back to her."'
4
Cooper continues by saying:
Scalia rejected the idea that O'Connor's refusal to cast the
fateful vote to reject Roe could have been based on an attempt to
avoid deciding constitutional questions unnecessarily. He also
dismissed the notion that O'Connor's approach could be
explained by "the quite separate principle that we will not
'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied,"' the argument
advanced by O'Connor in her separate concurrence in Webster. If
that principle was so important, he asked, why was it that Justice
O'Connor had done exactly that in two previous cases that term
and two other cases in recent years?""
In Closed Chambers, Edward Lazarus assesses Justice Scalia's reaction to
Justice O'Connor's decision to write a concurring opinion in Webster rather than
join the Rehnquist opinion. 47 Lazarus uses the term "apostasy""'8 to describe
Scalia's view of O'Connor's decision to write her own opinion: "Scalia circulated
a brutal attack on O'Connor's professed devotion to 'judicial restraint.' For page
after page, citing case after case, Scalia demolished the idea that O'Connor, as she
claimed in Webster, was a principled advocate for addressing only those
constitutional questions necessarily raised in a case. '
Lazarus labels O'Connor's opinion in Webster as a pretense. 5 Lazarus, also
accuses O'Connor of deciding on the result she wants and then writing whatever
becomes necessary to reach that result:'
Mangling a statute virtually beyond recognition in order to
manufacture a jurisprudential tie may have been a clever way for
O'Connor to postpone giving a definitive verdict on Roe; it may
even have been a courageous break from her accustomed allies;
but it was an act of restraint only in the narrowest sense of its
outcome.1
5 2
145. Id. at 49 (footnotes omitted).
146. Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted).
147. LAzARus, supra note 21, at 414-15.
148. Id. at 414.
149. Id. at 415.
150. Id. at 422 ("In Webster, what passed for judging was mostly pretense. Justice O'Connor
wrapped her decisive opinion in the Brandeisian vestments ofjudicial self-restraint. The fit, however,
was poor.").
151. Id. "She had predetermined that she wanted to uphold Missouri's statute under the Court's
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"For O'Connor, the recourse to judicial restraint was mere contrivance."' 53 As
Scalia elaborated inhis dissent in Webster, O'Connor's jurisprudential forbearance
was hardly consistent.'54 "When it suited her, especially in her favored field of
states' rights, she rivaled Brennan in her zeal to write broad and unnecessary
pronouncements on constitutional questions."'5 5 Lazarus further argues that "[o]ver
and over, O'Connor had either written or joined opinions that had reached more
broadly than required....""'
In an assessment of the Webster opinion's impact on the stature of the Court,
Lazarus concludes that the accusation of legal interpretation being driven by
personality and politics, an accusation once almost unheard of from the Justices
themselves, is one that is routinely leveled.'57 Justice O'Connor's dichotomous
affirmative action opinions demonstrate the dual facets of her personality:
Some who encounter O'Connor describe her as stiff and terse.
Others say she is courteous and charming. Both are accurate.
Visitors to the court are more likely to see the business-minded
justice at work, while those who see her on the Washington social
circuit are more likely to speak of the gracious and amiable
justice.'58
One ventures to say that controlling precedent in the affirmative action arena of the
law is Justice O'Connor's personality and politics-her Machiavellian will to
power.
B. Power Politics at Grass Roots Extremity
If Lazarus' description of what happens behind the scene of the courtroom and
in chambers is to be believed, somewhere Justice O'Connor learned to be coy, and
she has brought the energy of the word into her political arena with all of the
negativity that the term implies. 5 9 In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., O'Connor's
flirtatious opinion led legal scholars and lawyers to believe that affirmative action
plans could continue to prevail if they simply met a standard of scrutiny that
included evidence of prior state discrimination. 6 Flirts always leave the other party
hoping that there might be some chance of success. However, O'Connor proved
with her opinion in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena' that the hopes of
affirmative action supporters would never come to fruition.
Through flirtation and politics, O'Connor exercises her will on the Court.
O'Connor's opinions are the flagship opinions for affirmative action. Interestingly,
153. LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 422.
154. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532-36.
155. LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 422.
156. Id. at 415.
157. Id. at415-23.
158. David G. Savage, Sandra Day O'Connor, in 8 MEN AND A LADY 209 (1990).
159. See LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 414-15.
160. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,498-506 (1989).
161. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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her opinion for the Court in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. validated and
established parameters for "hostile-work-environment" claims.'62 O'Connor
understands what it is like to be a woman with a career in a male-dominated
profession. However, she does not understand being black or poor.
Other scholars have also questioned Justice O'Connor:
Her respect, even admiration, for the ruggedly self-reliant
individual is strikingly evident in O'Connor's famous concurrence
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. [Ann Hopkins] was denied
partnership because she was not conventionally feminine in her
dress and demeanor. To O'Connor, this was the essence of gender
discrimination.
O'Connor's majority opinion in Ford Motor Company v.
EEOC is in stark contrast. That case was brought by a group of
women with blue collar, factory jobs who had previously
prevailed in a Title VII sex discrimination claim against Ford....
In considering the nature and extent of the damages owed by
Ford, O'Connor displayed an almostLochnerian disregard for the
plaintiffs' job security concerns. According to O'Connor,
requiring Ford to offer retroactive seniority would hurt those
"innocent" male employees who had accrued seniority during the
pendency of plaintiffs' litigation....
... O'Connor, the successful career woman, can understand
and empathize with Ann Hopkins and the humiliation she
suffered. But O'Connor has little appreciation of the economic
vicissitudes faced by the women working at Ford and their
concerns for job security are foreign to her. Once again, her
experiential reasoning is bounded by the scope of her own life
experiences.
A similar myopia is evident in Justice O'Connor's decisions
on affirmative action.
63
As an elitist seeking power, O'Connor must continue to make herself appear
moderate. By portraying herself as moderate, her opinions can carry a plurality, if
not the majority. In some cases, she does not carry the majority because the more
progressive Justices will not join in her opinion. In the area of affimnative action,
O'Connor is openly hostile to attempts to change the status quo. The status quo
understands whiteness and preference to be one and the same. Relying on her
personal life experiences, Justice O'Connor simply cannot understand people
different from herself. She understands only the privileged white establishment and
162. 510 U.S. 17, 18-23 (1993).
163. Brown et al., supra note 21, at 1241-43 (footnotes omitted).
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its progeny, institutionalized racism."M However, even here Edward Lazarus
accuses her of being disingenuous. 6
In Closed Chambers, Lazarus makes clear that he believes O'Connor's opinion
in Croson lacked intellectual integrity.'66 He makes two quite telling points: (1)
O'Connor's opinion "fairly reeked of hypocrisy,' ' 167 and (2) O'Connor's opinion
was a "deeply cynical use of law."'
16
Lazarus makes his point on the hypocrisy issue by noting O'Connor's failure
to consider the relevance of Richmond's racist history in writing the Croson opinion
for the Court.
169
This history, much of it recent, was relevant as more than just
atmospherics. On behalf of a majority of the Court, Justice
O'Connor was ruling that, for the purposes of judicial review, a
preference in favor of a black contractor was the legal equivalent
of a law discriminating against a black contractor. In the context
of Richmond, this bland equivalence rankled. As even one
opponent of affirmative action said of such arguments, "To
pretend.., that the issue [of affirmative action] was the same as
the issue in Brown is to pretend that history never happened and
that the present doesn't exist."
164. Gottlieb, supra note 6, at 232.
[O'Connor's] opinions stress that individuals must earn what they have and use
it in what she regards as the public interest. O'Connor's view of the public
interest, however, is confined by a narrow perspective which leads her to
understand and trust voices of the establishment far more than those outside of
it.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
165. See LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 300.
166. Id. at 299.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 300.
169. Id. at 298.
In education, rather than comply with Brown v. Board of Education, this
former capital of the Confederacy had pursued a policy marked by what a panel
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals once called "sordid" efforts to
"circumvent, defeat, and nullify" the constitutional right of black children to
attend desegregated schools. In social relations, until 1967 Richmond was the
capital of a state that prohibited interracial marriage for fear of creating a
"mongrel race." In politics, as Richmond's black population neared 50 percent,
the city's white elite, determined to thwart growing black political power,
decided to dilute black voting strength by annexing part of an all-white
neighboring county. Only federal court intervention scotched the plan. And in
housing, Richmond's neighborhood development was so rife with
bigotry-racially restrictive covenants, race-based reclining, and the like-that
one court accused city officials of "tending to perpetuate apartheid of the races
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That O'Connor chose to slight this history suggested to those
who held opposing points of view that her stand was grounded not
in a high-minded opposition to race discrimination of every kind
but in an indifference to the larger issue of racism that formed the
legal, moral, and political backdrop to the case. And this
suspicion was emphatically confirmed and compounded by the
fact that a crucial aspect of her legal analysis fairly reeked of
hypocrisy.'
Lazarus also argues in Closed Chambers that O'Connor uses the law cynically
to advance her political agenda:
But whether or not others accepted the interpretation
O'Connor advanced, it was practically unimaginable that the
Justice subscribed to her own reasoning. In the annals of the
modem Court, no Justice, with the possible exception of
Rehnquist, has been more steadfastly devoted to states' rights-to
their autonomy, to the breadth of their powers, to the extreme
deference owed the judgments of their officials-than the former
Arizona legislator and state court judge Sandra Day O'Connor.
She had been weaned on her rancher-father's vehement
opposition to the big government social welfare policies of
Roosevelt's New Deal, and every station in her professional
career-from her first job as a deputy county attorney in San
Mateo, California, through her work as a precinct captain for
Barry Goldwater in 1964, until her appointment to the Arizona
bench-had served only to confirm her inherited bias toward lean
government and local autonomy. In every other field of law, from
habeas corpus to economic regulation, and in those opinions in
which O'Connor herself took the greatest pride, she championed
state authority in the face of federal interference and exalted the
centrality of state sovereignty in the overall constitutional scheme.
170. Id. at 298-99 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
In this respect, the problem with Justice O'Connor's opinion was not that it
concluded that all racial distinctions, both benign and invidious, must be
subjected to the same level of exacting scrutiny. The problem was it reached
this conclusion in a manner that ignored and seemed almost to trivialize the
suffering of the millions of blacks who had experienced by far the heaviest
burden of this country's racism-many of them in the very place from which the
Croson case arose. If, as O'Connor alleged, the Constitution protected
Richmond's whites and blacks equally from the effects of racial preferences, it
was not because the races were somehow equal in their victimhood; nor was it
(as the tone of O'Connor's opinion sometimes seemed to suggest) because
racism against Richmond's blacks was a relic of the past. It was because the
oppression of Richmond's blacks and their ancestors throughout the nation had
brought into being a principle of constitutional equality won not only for
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For O'Connor newly to discover that, in the single
circumstance of affirmative action, states were suddenly and
peculiarly disempowered in comparison to the federal
government, was a deeply cynical use of law.... In 1995, in
[Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,] an opinion striking down
a new federal construction set-aside[,] ... O'Connor repudiated
her Croson interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and
miraculously rediscovered that the provision's constitutional
mandate of equality applied "congruently" to the states and the
federal government.'
7'
It is this cynical aspect of O'Connor's Croson opinion that frustrated Scalia in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.' Clearly, this cynicism draws the
disrespect of Lazarus in Closed Chambers:73
Employing whichever legal arguments are necessary and
effective to defend a position is part of the craft of being a lawyer.
It is not, however, a legitimate part ofjudging. Judges serve as the
law's referees. They cannot declare illegitimate a particular type
of reasoning in one case and then use it themselves in another. To
do so invites colleagues and the community to suspect their
motives, especially when the subject matter is as sensitive as race.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor brought such charges to her door.
174
Such charges find a home at O'Connor's door because of her consistency in
writing for convenience rather than conviction and her consistency of self-reference
as her single source of authority.
The hypocrisy in O'Connor's opinions indicates that she is, above all else, a
politician determined to prevail. In her determination to prevail, she is aware of the
power she exerts by shifting her position to cast powerful and decisive votes on the
Court. 75 As Lazarus notes:
Occupying the pivot is often a deliberate strategy. Indeed,
Kennedy has been known to brag about expressing views at
conference designed to make him a necessary but distinctive fifth
vote for a majority. O'Connor pursues the same policy more
171. LAzARUS, supra note 21, at 300-01 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
172. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532-33 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
173. LAzARUS, supra note 21, at 300-01.
174. Id. at301.
175. See Peggy Edersheim Kalb, The 30 Most Powerful Women in America, LADIES' HOME J.,
Nov. 2001, at 110, 112. Kalb ranks O'Connor as the second most powerful woman in America and
notes that"her extraordinary power comes largely fromherrole on a divided [Court-with O'Connor
often casting the deciding vote." Id. Kalb notes that O'Connor's vote is considered critical in
upcoming issues such as "school vouchers and voter redistricting" and that "O'Connor's decision on
these issues will affect how billions of dollars will be spent." Id.
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quietly. Both, in effect, hold constitutional interpretation hostage
to their personal and often idiosyncratic views.'76
It is evident that Justice O'Connor often finds ways to fit a square peg in a
round hole, but she takes every opportunity to dislodge a round peg from a round
hole. Though she tries to argue the Court's position under the veil of conservatism,
the argument is better labeled individualism. Unfortunately, this individualism has
been detrimental to African Americans.'77
C. A Theoretical Analysis of O 'Connor's Quest for Power
In this Essay, power is defined as "the ability to favorably change the
bargaining set."' 78 In the 1880s, Friedreich Nietzche, in a discussion of power,
noted that "[p]sychologists should bethink themselves before putting down the
instinct of self-preservation as the cardinal instinct of an organic being. A living
thing seeks above all to discharge its strength-life itself is Will to Power; self-
preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results thereof."'79 Justice
O'Connor is well beyond the self-preservation stage of her career. She is at the
zenith of her career in terms of years, and, during those years, she has been building
her power blocks-one case at a time." As has been noted, O'Connor uses her
power to sway the Court when it favors her beliefs. 8 '
Though Justices O'Connor and Scalia each subscribe to the Court's
conservative equality jurisprudence, their battles are well noted.'82 Robin West
argues that the origin of equal protection rendered by the Court "can readily and
easily be traced to conservatism's political andjurisprudential premises."' For this
proposition, West cites City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson Co.'84 as the conservative
Court's paradigm Equal Protection Clause case, destined to become central to the
conservatives' developing understanding of equality doctrine. 8 '
To say that O'Connor and Scalia subscribe to the conservative Court's
jurisprudence on equality doctrine is an understatment. Of course they subscribe to
176. LAZARUS, supra note 21, at 515.
177. See supra Parts II.A & B.
178. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR 250 (1986).
179. NIETZSCHE, supra note 22, at 18.
180. See Kalb, supra note 175, at 110. Kalb ranks O'Connor as the most powerful American
woman in the "Financial Impact" category:
Money may not be everything, but controlling it confers great power. While our
list includes many very wealthy women, Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor took the top score in this category. O'Connor plays an important, and
sometimes unpredictable, role in final decisions with huge financial
impact-potential rulings as diverse as whether school vouchers are
constitutional, and what should happen in the ongoing Microsoft case.
Id.
181. LAZARU, supra note 21, at 413-16.
182. See supra Part III.A.
183. West, supra note 30, at 669.
184. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
185. West, supra note 30, at 669.
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it-they wrote it. Tracing her theory of the Court's conservatism regarding
competition, West writes the following:
[In the politics of a] free-market conservative, race ought not to be
a determinant of legislative decisionmaking that affects the
success of individuals in competitive economic
markets-regardless of whether the motive of such legislation is
benign or malignant.... For the conservative instrumentalist, the
purpose of law should be to free economic competition, so that
economic power can prevail unimpeded by extrinsic
considerations. The [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause should therefore
be read in such a way as to further this purposive mandate.
Discriminatory, race-conscious legislation generally inhibits
rather than furthers competition, and hence trenches on
competitive values. If competitive rationality is the purpose-and
therefore the meaning-of equality and of equal protection, it
obviously makes no difference whether the discriminatory
legislation is malignant or benign-either way it inhibits
competition. The result in Croson is substantially in accord. Thus,
Justice O'Connor's summary of the Court's holding emphasizes
both the value of competition and conservative instrumental
themes ... 16
In Croson, O'Connor's opinion protects economic advantage. The opinion
delivers ongoing institutionalization of "whiteness as property,"1 87 and portrays
precisely what Michel Foucault says needs to be understood about power:
We need to see how these mechanisms of power, at a given
moment, in a precise conjuncture and by means of a certain
number of transformations, have begun to become economically
advantageous and politically useful .... It is only if we grasp
these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic
advantages or political utility that derive[d] from them in a given
context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these
mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social
whole.'
The very real impact of O'Connor's affinnative action opinions is that they
cater to conservative theorists and reward the conservative, grassroots following
with continued advantage. This advantage jeopardizes the integrity of competition.
As with the game of golf, only when the handicap is accounted for is there integrity
in competition. Competition without integrity fails to utilize all available and able
186. Id.
187. Harris, supra note 3, at 1707.
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energy. O'Connor's power on the Supreme Court flows into the capillaries of the
American economy and stifles international competition with institutional racial
prejudice.
In an analysis of power, Foucault urges that we go beyond the central location
of power and apply it "at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those
points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and
institutions."' 8 9 Following this analysis, one should look beyond the courts and the
legal system to see the impact of O'Connor's opinions. The institutions held in
place by the power of "the law" would be the focus of this analysis. A good
example of a capillary of Supreme Court power is the bidding process for state-
sponsored projects in this country. Because of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.,' 90
those already empowered can expect ongoing entitlements. Foucault explains how
central power flows through capillaries at the "point where power surmounts the
rules ofright which [organize] and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests
itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with
instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention."' 9' This
fulcrum point that Foucault describes is institutional racism, and its impact is
evident when a parts supplier such as the one in Croson refuses to quote a price for
parts to an African American businessman attempting to bid on a job.92
The Foucault description of power flowing into the extremities of a system
describes how O'Connor's affirmative action politics have impacted African
Americans. One author has said that "Justice O'Connor used the phrase 'strict
scrutiny' despite its long history of use by opponents of affirnative action who
advocate a color-blind approach to block color-conscious remedy. If she did not
mean to gut affirmative action, she should change her phrase or explain it better."' 93
Perhaps O'Connor did mean to gut affirmative action as she indicated in
Adarand.94 The writer continues: "Failure to correct the course set by the
underlying messages of Croson will make Justice O'Connor, more than any other
Justice, responsible for a retrenchment by federal and state courts in the response
to race discrimination."' 95 O'Connor toes the party line on the race question,
insisting on a "color-blind" interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause and on a
"formal" understanding of the equality that Clause protects. Therefore, city, state,
and federally initiated affirmative action plans that are meant to eradicate the effects
of societal discrimination are unconstitutional.' 96 Unless O'Connor overrules
herself, she will continue to toe the party line-a party line she created through her
opinions.
189. Id. at 96.
190. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
191. FOUCAULT, supra note 188, at 96.
192. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 482.
193. Douglas D. Scherer, Affirmative Action Doctrine and the Conflicting Messages ofCroson,
38 U. KAN. L. REV. 281, 340 (1990).
194. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
195. Scherer, supra note 193, at 340.
196. West, supra note 30, at 670, 672.
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IV. CONCLUSION
"Thus, to summarize, equality means 'formal equality' and no
more in the conservative paradigm .... ,,197
In response to an invocation of the principle of color blindness as the basis for
opposing remedial programs, Burke Marshall stated:
I think that we would have no debate over whether or not a policy
of nondiscrimination or [color blindness] is an ideal for an ideal
society. The problem is that ours is not an ideal society. Ours is a
society that is still permeated by racial discrimination and even
more so by the traces of racial oppression that was permitted
legally as well as socially and economically up until a little less
than thirty years ago. And in that context it does not seem to me
that it is possible to take the position ... that the remedy for
discrimination can be on a basis that does not take race into
account.'98
Oliver and Shapiro would argue that nothing has changed over the past thirty
years. Certainly, the two would argue that African Americans continue to
experience racial oppression that deprives the black population of wealth in the
form of assets. Housing segregation and neighborhood redlining are not legal. Even
so, the practices seemingly continue and their impact continues to be felt. 99
From an economic impact perspective, "[i]n American society, a stable
economic foundation must include a command over assets as well as an adequate
income flow. Nowhere is this observation better illustrated than by the case of black
Americans."2 0 Oliver and Shapiro insist that:
Too much of the current celebration of black success is related to
the emergence ofaprofessional and middle-class black population
that has access to a steady income. Even the most visibly
successful numbers of the black community-movie and TV
stars, athletes, and other performers-are on salary. But, income
streams do not necessarily translate into wealth pools.
Furthermore, when one is black, one's current status is not easily
passed on to the next generation. The presence of assets can pave
the way for an extension and consolidation of status for a family
over several generations."
197. Id. at 672.
198. Burke Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation Of
Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1006 (1984).
199. See Haya El Nasser & Paul Overberg, Index Charts Growth in Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar.
15, 2001, at 3A (arguing that even though the nation's diversity index increased by twenty-three
percent from 1990 to 2000, segregation continues).
200. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 175.
201. Id. at 175-76.
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Oliver and Shapiro clarify the importance of generational wealth. The authors
are unequivocal in their position that the economic cleavages between the races are
deep and historically rooted.0 2 Lest one stutter in the iteration about the nexus
between race and class, the authors repeat:
The interaction of race and class in the wealth accumulation
process is clear. Historical practices racist in their essence have
produced class hierarchies that, on the contemporary scene,
reproduce wealth inequality. As important, contemporary racial
disadvantages deprive those in the black middle class from
building on their wealth assets at the same pace as similarly
situated white Americans. 20 3
The affirmative action plan in Croson,0 4 the monetary incentive inAdarand,°5
and the minority ownership policies in Metro Broadcasting, Inc."0 6 had a common
intent. Each was designed to offer a helping hand to black, small-business owners
who were self-employed. Many small businesses fail "within the first five years."20 7
Furthermore, "[s]evere economic restrictions have historically prevented many
African Americans from establishing successful businesses. These include
segregation, legal prohibition, acts of violence, discrimination, and general access
only to so-called black markets."20 8 The challenged affirmative action plans that
were held unconstitutional would have helped many families see their small
businesses succeed, and struggles to lessen a deeply rooted poverty could have
produced the beginnings of generational asset building.
Personal position in society-personal status-plays a significant role in
creating a feeling of security about the future. Assets give us a feeling that there is
always a safety net underneath as we seek our own self-actualization. "'The secret
point of money and power in America is neither the things that money can buy nor
power for power's sake ... but absolute personal freedom, mobility, privacy,'
according to Joan Didion. Money allows one 'to be a free agent, [and] live by one's
own rules." 0 9 The "free agent" lifestyle for blacks is precisely what the "rights of
whites"2 ' intend to prevent. An increase in black free agents would cause the labor
pool to shrink at the expense of the white workforce.
Justice O'Connor's will to power drives her politics on affirmative action. She
understands very well the value of assets. She undoubtedly knows that color-blind
theory effectuates a divided America. She also must know that white entitlement
is anchored in the deprivation of minorities.
202. Id. at 176.
203. Id.
204. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
205. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).
206. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 555 (1990).
207. OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 1, at 182.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 172.
210. Greene, supra note 20, at 1517.
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Affirmative action is about more than individual income generation. When one
views depriving a minority of an opportunity to win a bid or obtain a radio license
as a block to gaining generational wealth and as asset deprivation, the severe
deleterious impact of O'Connor's opinions becomes evident. The opinions support
the deprivation of black intergenerational transmission of wealth. What an
impoverished legacy Justice O'Connor has handed to African Americans and
ultimately to the American economy.1
211. InAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Court remanded the case
for a determination of whether the factual circumstances, including congressional findings relied on
for passage of the legislation that fostered the Adarand litigation, could withstand a narrowly tailored
remedy test. Id. at 237-39. In its decision, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, on yet another appeal
from the trial court, held that the most recent congressional action meets the test and that the remedy
provided for is sufficiently narrowly tailored. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 1147,
1176-88 (10th Cir. 2000). This decision held constitutional the incentive so hotly contested in the
seemingly neverending Adarand litigation. Id. Both the trial court and court of appeals noted that it
is time the litigation ended. Id. at 1161; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1558
(D. Colo. 1997).
Like Scherer, supra note 193, the author is willing to engage in wishful thinking. This author is
more than willing to have the thesis of this Essay proven wrong and read a Supreme Court decision
in which Justice O'Connor votes to find any affirmative action plan constitutional. It would be better
still if she wrote the opinion upholding the plan. Only then will one really know if the O'Connor
opinion in the Court's existing Adarand case actually intends that strict scrutiny not be fatal in theory
and also not be fatal in fact. The Supreme Court's acceptance of the latestround ofAdarand litigation
for decision is located at 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001).
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